Department of Children and Family Services v. Leons, Et Al., 32 Fla. L. Weekly D503 (Fla. March 2, 2007).Bidwell case.  What do we do with incompetent defendants who are illegally being held in county jail because DCF has no place to house them? According to DCF, do nothing. After Judge Bidwell ordered DCF to provide in-custody treatment for incompetent defendants being held in BCJ, DCF took a petition for writ of certiorari to the supreme court. The court held that Bidwell’s order was in complete compliance with existing statutory authority.

State v. Olave, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D517 (Fla. 4th DCA March 2, 2007). Seigal case. Cops legally stop Olave and find out that his license is restricted to business purposes only. They ask Olave to step out of the car for safety reasons while they further check the status of his license. Another cop asks Olave if he had any drugs or weapons in his pockets. Olave responds that he has some pills and consents to a search. He is subsequently charged with possession of alprazolam. Segal granted a motion to suppress based on the fact that Olave’s statement leading to the search was an "interrogation" and required Miranda warnings. The district court reversed finding that this was a routine traffic stop and although Olave was detained, he had not been "arrested." Therefore, there was no custodial interrogation.

Lorenzo v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D536 (Fla. 3d DCA March 2, 2007). Cop goes to Defendant’s mother’s house to inquire about a van she had for sale.  (The cop and Defendant's mother knew each other.)  Defendant’s mother told the cop that she was afraid that her son was involved in various robberies and was worried about him. The cop went to Lorenzo’s house and he voluntarily accompanied the cop to the station where he gave a statement about a robbery without Miranda warnings.  After making the statement, the cop arrested him. The cop went back to speak with Lorenzo the next day, read him his Miranda warnings, and he confessed to other robberies. The court held that because he voluntarily went to the station and was free to leave, the first statement was not a "custodial interrogation" and, therefore, Miranda warnings were not needed. Second, because there was nothing wrong with the first statement, the other statements made after Miranda could not be fruits of the prior, unwarned statement.

Johnson v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D539 (Fla. 3d DCA March 2, 2007). The court refused to consider a YO sentence because the defendant failed to acknowledge his culpability for the charged offense. The court held : "It is apodictic that a criminal defendant has the right to maintain his or her innocence and have a trial by jury. . . .[a] trial court may not hold a defendant’s protestation of innocence against that defendant in either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial."

Owens v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D544 (Fla. 4th DCA March 2, 2007). Seidman case. Owens is charged with battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting with violence. Case reversed for a basic error: Seidman allowed a cop to testify to the hearsay contents of a dispatch that an officer was "violently fighting with a subject." It is permissible for a cop to testify that a dispatch occurred to explain subsequent police action, but the contents of the dispatch are not admissible.

State v. Galicia, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D547 (Fla.2d DCA March 2, 2007). The cop legally stopped the car in which Galicia was a passenger. As the driver was getting his ticket, a cop went to Galicia and asked for ID. Galicia produced a false resident alien ID and was arrested. The court held that this was nothing more than a consensual encounter and that Galicia had the right to walk away and not show the cop his ID. Therefore, the production of the ID was voluntary and the arrest was proper.

Wilson v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D553 (Fla. 5th DCA March 2, 2007). Defendant lives on a 36-acre parcel of land. A vegetative buffer makes it impossible to see the interior of the property and there a perimeter fence around the entire parcel of land. About 100 feet behind the defendant’s residence - a trailer - is a greenhouse, which is only partially visible from the residence. Based on the four-prong test announced in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987), the court found that this greenhouse was not within the curtilage of the Defendant’s home and, therefore, the Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in the pot he was growing inside the greenhouse. The cops looked into the greenhouse and saw marijuana; they entered the property on four occasions. On the fourth time, the Defendant and his dog approached the cops. The cops pulled their guns, ordered the Defendant to the ground and threatened to shoot the dog if it was not controlled. They took the Defendant back to the house where he consented to a search of the greenhouse and residence. Considering the defendant’s age, his prior criminal history, and his mental state, they found the consent was voluntary.