Stumpff, although inactive, remained an “auxiliary law enforcement officer” under section 943.10(8), Florida Statutes. His certification had not been revoked.

Because Stumpff was still certified, under section 790.06(5)(b), he was permitted to carry a concealed weapon as a private citizen. The court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal.

Imperato - Reversed and Remanded

We reverse Conaway’s sentences and remand for the trial court to receive a n d consider a presentence investigation report before resentencing Conaway.  In all othe respects, we affirm.

Murphy - Reversed for new trial

Defendant was on trial for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor battery. He claimed self defense. He sought to adduce testimony that the same persons involved in the altercation that was the subject of the criminal charges on trial had, on a previous occasion, also attacked him. The trial judge sustained the State’s objection that this evidence would be irrelevant.

 ... Defendant’s proffered testimony was relevant to show that his belief in the necessity of defending himself against the persons involved in the present altercation was reasonable.

S. Kaplan - Reversed and Remanded

Since the trial court mistakenly thought Kohr was charged with a felony instead of a misdemeanor on count III, no effort was made toensure Kohr knowingly entered a guilty plea to an offense greater than the one charged. Therefore, the trial court erred in convicting Kohr of felony criminal mischief and sentencing Kohr to five years of probation for that count...As to Kohr’s remaining arguments, we affirm without discussion.

Gardiner - Reversed

We reverse multiple convictions for burglary and grand theft for lack of proof of essential elements of the crimes charged...

A special standard of review applies when a conviction is based wholly on circumstantial evidence. Where the sole proof of guilt lies in circumstantial evidence, no matter how strongly it suggests guilt there can be no conviction unless the evidence is inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence...

The conviction for Count 1, burglary of a dwelling or structure with damage in excess of $1,000, is reduced to simple burglary of a dwelling and shall be resentenced accordingly. The convictions for the crimes involving homes #3, #4, and #5 are reversed with directions to enter judgments of acquittal.

S. Kaplan - Mitigation Quashed

On February 14, 2007, Schlabach was sentenced to five years imprisonment for a violation of probation. Fifty-four days later, Schlabach filed a motion to reduce or modify her sentence. On May 14, 2007, a notice of hearing was filed and on May 30, 2007, the trial court heard and granted the motion, terminating the balance of Schlabach’s sentence.

Here, because no hearing was scheduled and no action was taken within the sixty day period, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the sentence.

Gold - Reversed and Remanded

Thomas Osborne appeals his conviction and sentence on the charge of possession of burglary tools. We reverse because the trial court erred in allowing the state, at trial, to introduce irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence of a gun.

There is a strong possibility that the introduction of the gun, magnified by the state’s highly inappropriate closing arguments, affected the jury’s verdict in this case. The state misled the jury into thinking that the gun was evidence that Osborne was guilty of possessing burglary tools. Moreover, although the gun was a toy, Osborne was prejudiced by the state’s repeated emphasis that he was carrying a gun at the time that he allegedly committed the crimes. Admission of the irrelevant, highly prejudicial gun evidence was harmful error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Rodriguez-Powell - Reversed for New Trial

Over appellant’s objection, the trial court allowed the officer to testify that appellant had $200 in his pocket when he was arrested. Appellant argues that, because he was charged only with possession, the evidence of money found in his pocket was irrelevant and prejudicial. Appellant’s argument is supported by the factually similar cases of Buitrago v. State, and Ferguson v. State, in which we held that, in possession cases, evidence of money found on the defendant was irrelevant and prejudicial.

S. Kaplan - Reversed in part and quashed in part

                PROBATION TRANSPORTATION CASE:  "Judge Kaplan has had a standing order for about the last 20 years that people under his supervision who test positive for drugs are to be taken into custody immediately.  The No. 1 concern is for the community. It concerns him that people who are on probation or house arrest and are abusing drugs are remaining on the streets."
                                                                   -Tony Loe, February 2008

Until recently, the Department had agreements with local law enforcement agencies which arrested and transported defendants pursuant to the 2003 order at the Department’s request, but due to funding problems, the Broward Sheriff’s Office (BSO) and local municipal police departments have refused to continue doing so with respect to three of the Broward Circuit’s probation offices. Thus, Sharrard informed Judge Kaplan that the Department might not be able to continue complying with the 2003 order. The judge issued an order to show cause and the Department served a response which explained that probation officers have neither the training nor the resources to transport offenders to jail; the Department’s procedures require probation officers to contact local law enforcement for assistance with such arrest a n d transport; a n d probation officers drive their own personal vehicles, in which Department procedures prohibit the transport of offenders...

(Kaplan's) order directs the Department “to immediately effectuate procedures necessary to comply with the said Order within thirty (30)days from the date hereof” or the judge would take further action to ensure compliance...

In both orders, Judge Kaplan appears to have usurped the discretion granted by the legislature to the Department and its probation officers, to determine whether to arrest an offender, by requiring the warrantless arrest of all his supervised offenders who test positive for a prohibited substance...

The orders in question interfere with the discretion which the legislature granted to the probation supervisors, as well as with funding decisions made b y th e department. Section 948.06 gives probation officers discretion—“may arrest” (emphasis added)—whether to effect a warrantless arrest of a violator...

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the 2008 order and reverse it. With respect to that order and the 2003 order, we find that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by specifying the offenders with respect to whom the department’s officers were required to exercise their discretion to effect warrantless arrests.

M. Kaplan - Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings

The record does not establish whether appellant’s other conviction constitutes a n independent basis for deportation under federalimmigration law; that is not an issue to be decided first in the appellate court. See Buton v. State. The trial court should have afforded Defendant at least one opportunity to amend his motion to allege that the plea in this case alone subjects him to deportation.

                                                    (Does Not Include PCAs)